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.-IOUDRUFF ASHTON,
Plaintiff and Respondent,

Case t<o. 19129

-vsWTLFROD ASHTON and VIRGINIA M.
ASHTON,
Defendants and

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF

STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE
This is an action brought by Respondent against Appellants
ctsking the trial court to impress a Constructive Trust for his
benefit upon certain real property standing in the name of the
Appellants located in Washington County, Utah or in the alternative claiming adverse possession on the part of Respondent and
against Appellants regarding said property.
DISO'OSITION IN LOWER COURT
The case was tried to a jury.
11"1

i t

tile'

The Court submitted the

"r to the jury on special interrogatories as follows and
iury <lnswered as follows

(R. 48):

( l)

""""
INTERHOGATORY NUMBER ONE:
subject property to Wilford c1nd Virqin10 M.

/\sht<in,

w"s hJo

deeding conditional upon \'l1lfo1d and Virq1n1<1 d,•,•clu 1'.J

1; 1.

F.,

one-half of the property to \'looclruff when Wood111ff':" mdrrt,il
problems had ended?
JURY'S ANSWER TO INTERROGATOEY NUMBER ONE:
INTERROGATORY NUMBER TWO:

Did

fidence and trust exist between Frank,

Yc"s.

relationship of c:on-

ct

Wilford and VirgHna at

the time of the deeding?
JURY'S ANSWER TO INTERROGATORY NUMBER TWO:

Yes.

INTERROGATORY NUMBER THREE:

Did Wilford and Virg1n1a

breach this relationship of trust,

if any of you so find, by

failing or refusing to deed to Woodruff following his divore•
from Edith in 1980 with the result that Wilford and Virg1n1a
are thereby unjustly enriched?
JURY'S ANSWER TO INTERROGATORY NUMBER THREE:

Yes.

Based upon the findings of the jury on the special interrogatories the Court entered Findings of Facts and Conclusionr
of Law in conformance therewith

(R.

49-54)

and entered its

judgement ordering the Appellants to Quit Claim the East
of the subject property together with one-half of the water or.
whole property to Respondent

(R.

55-56).

From a verdict and

judgement for the Respondent the Appellants have appealed.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondent requests that the Supreme Court affirm UL'
verdict and 1udgement entered in the· trial court.

12 )

STATEMENT OF FACTS
The Respondent is the brother and brother-in-law of the
r.1,t•c·l cants Woodruff dnd Virginia M.

.,nd P.p1•el.Lant ililford

The Respondent

P.shton had an oluer brother named Frank

A.;hton 1Jho died December 10, l'lE.8
t·rank Ashton he owned a forty

shares

Ashton (T. 5).

(T. 5).

Prior to the death of

acre tract of real estate with two

irrigation water in or about Hurricane, Washington

County, State of Utah (T. 6), but sold twelve acres of that
property to a third party leaving a balance of twenty-eight
cicres plus the two shares of water standing in his name (T. 6)
Prior to the death of Frank Ashton the Respondent helped him
farm and place improvements on the subject property (T. 31, 32).
In Addition, Frank had told the brothers' sister Agnes Connell,
t:1at

h,e

planned to give the ;:iroperty to his younger brothers

Wilford and Woodruff upon his death (T. 174, 175, 176).
On Nmrer.1ber 18, 1968 Frank Ashton executed his Warranty

Deed conveying title to the property to the Appellants as joint
tenaants (EX.
Frank Ashton was buried on December 13, 1968 (T. 32) and
on the same day the Ashton fa.mily met for a family dinner at the
hone of Appellant Wilford Ashton (T. 32, EX. P-40, P-41).

At

that time and place a conversation took place wherein the Appellant
1·/1lford Ashton advised the family that he had received a deed to
subject property from Frank a few days prior to his death
•nd
• l1dt

that he had promised Frank,

in consideration of the conveyance,

as soon as the Res::iond·ent solved his marital problem with
Edith,

that he

(Wilford) would convey the East half of

tn" ;ub]ect prop2rt:• and 0:1e-half of the water rights to the
R,·c;!HJnlic>nt

(T.

33,

34,

35,

36,

37, 170, 171, 172, 173, 174, 175).

In addition,
as long

dS

the Appc.'1lc1nt

the

w.1s

\·iilfnrcl
qct_

t(J

he should pay half of Frcrnk'" hurldl
Respondent suLsequtcntly did

(T.

l8,

ih:it ''"

,,1

()Jl.__,-t1,1L1

<it

feces

37)

(T.

EX. l'-22,

i

',;1 11

:i

,

11 ,

l'-20).

Subsequent to this m•·etinq th" Respondent \-io"cirul

t

Ashton became actively involved in cultivatino thee :;ub],ccr_
property
P-10,

(T.

P-8,

41,

P-6)

42,

43,

44,

75,

76,

77,

78, EX.

P-9, P-S, µ_-

and placed improvements on the East half of

the subject property which he considered to be his

(T. 45, 46,

In addition the two brothers Wilford and Woodruff met at one
time and arrived at an agreement as to how the subject properc
would be divided in accordance with Frank's wishes
52,

53,

54,

55,

56,

57,

EX.

P-30)

showing their proposed division

( T. 4 9,

s,

and placed certain markings

(T.

54,

55,

56,

57,

EX. P-3, p.:

In addition during the fourteen years between the dea··

P-11).

of Frank Ashton until the present law suit was filed the
ent paid one-half of the property taxes on the subject proper'.
and one-half of the water assessment on the subject property
65,

66,

P-18,

67,

68,

P-21).

69,

Also,

70,

71,

72,

73,

74, EX.

P-19, P-1, P-17, ,._

he placed certain improvements on the ercc

erty consisting of a new barn,

a corral, a loading shute, sG•

house and shed

84, 85,

(T.

87,

(T.

81,

82,

83,

86)

and a pond and rc>sc.

88).

During the passage of time the Respondent rn<ldt> rt•CJU'cc'
the Appellants to convey to l11m his share of the sutJ]eCt l'r,-,
but the Appellants refused to mdk,· s11ch

'''1

his mdrl 1_..Jl

that the Respondt...:nt hdd not

1,11

lil t IL

1,1-,

V'l

f<e Fcl1th

(T.

94,

95)

In October of 1980 the marital relationship between Edith
c;t1':

U12

P.<espowl'-'nt

% ,

L;X.

P-15).

WdS

terminated by a Decree of Divorce (T. 95,

Subsequent thereto the Respondent made request

his brother to convey to Respondent the subject property, but
A?pellant failed and refused to do so (T. 97, 98, 99, 100,
101,

102,

103, :!.04).

During all of the time herein mentioned

one-half of the water originally belonging to Frank Ashton was
used by the Respondent to irrigate his claimed half of the subJect real property (T. 106, 107).
ARGUMENT
POIFIT I:

RESPONDENT MET HIS BURDEN OF PROOF IN PROVING

A COtlSTRUCTIVE TRUST AGAINST APPELLANTS INVOLVING THE SUBJECT
PROPERTY.
The doctrine of Constructive Trust has been recognized
by the law for many years.

The following is a statement of the

doctrine set forth in the RESTATEMEN'l' Of" •rttE LAW OF TRUSTS

at

section 45:
(1)
Where the owner of an interest in land transfers
it inter vivos to another in trust for a third person, but
no memorandum properly evidencing the intention to create
a trust is signed, and the transferee refuses to perform
the trust, the transferee holds the interest upon a constructive trust for the third person, if, but only if,
(a)
the transferee by fraud, duress or undue influence prevented the transferor from creating an
enforceable interest in the third person, or
(b)
the transferee at the time of the transfer was
in a confidential relation to the transferor, or
(c)
the transfer was made by the transferor in contemplation of death.
In dddit1on Utah,

for many years, has recognized the law

( 5)

dealing with Constructive Trusts

und

the Supn·rn··

C«iirt

11_1)

upheld Constructive Trusts itn['OS•"d Liy the Court; CilPtiL, 1,,,
CARNESECCA
209 P.

(utah 1977)

P.

2cl 708;

liA\IS

2d 229; MATTER OF ESTATE OF HOCK

VS.

JENSf:n

(Ut1l,

(Utah 1982) 655

To set up Constructive Trusts under the c1rcumstancec
we are presently deuling with the following must exist:
a)

a confident_ial relationship and arrangement betw""'

the parties to the arrangement must exist.
b)

There must be a conveyance of real estate to the

Defendants.
c)

Facts showing breach of a confidence giving rise tG

UllJUSt enrichment -c.o U1e Defendants.
Sect.

221 et Seq Trust.

1953)

253 P.

2d.

372

HAWKINS

76 AM.

JUR. 2d

vs - PERRY et al (Utar

(see Haws vs. Jensen and Matter of

Estate of Hock above);

NIELSON vs RASMUSSEN

(Utah 1976)

P. 2d 5ll.
An examination of the record in this case shows without
being controverted that the Appellant Wilford Ashton made on
agreement with his brother Frank that as soon as Woodruff so)v,
his marital problems with Edith that Wilford would convey t1J
Woodruff the East half of the subject property together with,_
appurtenant water right.

The testimony of Woodruff Ashton, o'.

Agnes Connell and of Gary Ashton is uncontroverted in this rIn addition the fact that a conveyance of the real estatee tr'
Frank Ashton,

the deceased brother,

Ashton is uncontroverted.

have failed to

to Wilford and V1rgin1n

In addition it is uncontrovertd

the

dS dqret.:d.

([,)

Also,

.1

t<lt1onship existed in that the record is clear that Frank
1\:;t1tun

the brother anc brother-in-law of the Appellants

W<lS

anC. Virginia M.. Ashton.

is

d

Further the Respondent Woodruff

brother and brother-in-law of Frank, Wilford and

Viryinia M. Ashton.

There can be no suestion as to a confid-

In addition and as further support for the position of
the Respondent the record clearly shows, without being controverted, that for a period of some fourteen years the Respondent went
on the property, ciltivated it, improved it, and paid his share
of the property tax and water assessments.

In addition at one

time Woodruff and Wilford entered into an agreement dividing the
property.

The record is uncontroverted as to this agreement and

is further uncontroverted that the two brothers marked their
division by a readily identifiable monument.
The cases are legion wherein the Utah Supreme Court has
stdted that it will not lightly over turn a jury verdict..

In

addition the Utah Supreme Court stated in the MATTER OF THE ESTATE

or

HOCK, cited above as follows:
"In our review of an equity case such as this, we will not
disturb the trial courts findings of facts unless the
evidence clearly preponderates against it. We apply this
standard of review in cases involving trusts which arise
by operation of law and in which the standard of proof is
one of clear and convincing evidence." (see HOCK above at
page 1114; see also JE\"IELL v. HORNER, 12 Utah 2d 328,
366 P. 2d 596 (1961).
It is clear that the Plaintiff has met his burden of proof

n1d

th'" Appellants must fa.il in their claim that he hasn't.

( 7)

POINT II:

TI!E TRIAL COURT DID NOT L:l\l<

CONSTRUCTIVE TRUST AGAINST VIRGINIA M

<1Pi'l,Y

ASHTIJN

In point II of their arqument thee Ap[wl l ant'" ,ir._
claiming that even if the Court were to find

C'on;,trw:t iv_-

<l

against Appellant Wilford Ashton that it could not find
structive Trust against Appellant Virginia M. Ashton as th·-·r,c
no evidence that she made any agreement with the
transferor Frank Ashton.

<lnd

This premise does not conform t_o Uca,

law as set forth in the case of HAWKINS vs. PERRY (Utah 1953)

253 P. 2d 372.
teen,

In the Hawkins case, Hawkins,

then a boy of s:,_.

gave his Uncle Alfred T. Perry money to purchase a home:·

Perry's name with the understanding that as soon as Hawkins
reached the age of majority Perry would convey the home to
Hawkins.

Title to the home was taken in the name of Perry anc

wife Lorene.

Subsequent thereto Alred and Lorene Perry ter-

minated their marriage by divorce and Lorene was awarded the
subject home.

Hawkins then sued Lorene to get the home bad
Lorene defended on the basis ther

alleging Constructive Trust.

she was not a party to her husbands agreement with Hawkins
therefore was not bound by it.

Justice Crockett in speaking f,

the Utah Supreme Court said in part as follows:
"Any title which Lorene Perry could have acquired in
this property, either by being named joint tenant p01chaser in the contract or by the divorce decree
her Perry's interest must be derived through !um. Th'J
his acts in connection with the acquisition of the pr·-·:erty are binding on her; she can not reap the benefit
the favorable aspects of his conduct without beinrJ Lr·_,,.,
ed by that which is unfavorable." (See Hawkins at f'J'J'

( 8)

Justice Crockett went on to state briefly the position
"f

thto Utah Court regarding Constructive Trust.
Equity imposes a constructive trust to prevent one from
unjustly profiting through fraud or the violation of a
duty
under a fiduciary or confidential relationship.
The Utah decision of Chadwick v. Arnold (34 Utah 84, 95
r. 572) declares
a trust ex maleficio (constructive
trust) arises whenever a person acquired the legal title
to property of another by means of an intentional false or
fraudulent verbal promise to hold the same for a certain
purpose, and, having thus obtained the title, retains and
claims the property as his own."
It is now well recognized
that actual fraud is not necessary, but may be presumed
where there is a relationship of confidence between the
parties to a transaction and there are "other circumstances
tending to show that some advantage had been taken by the
doroinant party with a consequent abuse of confidence."
In Haws v. Jensen 209 P. 2d 229, he wrote:
" A constructive trust will be imposed even though at the
time of the transfer the transferee intended to perform
the agreement, and even though he was not guilty of undue
influence in procuring the conveyance. The abuse of the
confidential relation consists merely in the failure of
the transferee to perform his promise."
To this may be added, the confidential relation can also
be abused by the primisor's allowing himself to get into
a position where he cannot perform his promise.
It is clear that the position of Appellant Virginia M.

Ashton is the same as that of her husband Wilford and under the
doctrine of the Hawkins

case the Constructive Trust must be

applied against her as well as her husband.
POINT III:

THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN REFUSING TO ALLOW

APPELLANTS' EXPERT WITNESS TO TESTIFY.
An examination of the transcript of the trial procedings
,_,Jnlffiencing at page 403 of the transcript will show that Appellants
11,•d as Appellants' witness Mr. Lowry Snow, an attorney and
dbstractor.

Respondent's attorney stipulated as to Mr. Snow's

qualifications as an expert attorney dncl clbslrdctor.
became apparent the direction of

<l

Ill' ':t

11

line• uf quc:;t1on1ng thr"

Appellants were taking with Mr. Snow,

th e> Court,
1

sud

refused to allow counsel to continue his line of questioning.
Counsel for Appellants therefore asked for permission to
a prof er of proof outside the hear ins of the Jury, which regue,._
was granted.

As counsel for Respondent understands the

of proof, Appellants were at tempting to ask the witness to give
his expert testimony as to the effects of the severance of a
joint tenancy.

Apparently the theory of Appellants' oounsel

was that Wilford Ashton,

by agreeing to the conditions imposed

by Frank Ashton in making the subject conveyance had "severed"
the joint tenancy prior to its creation and therefore
M. Ashton,

as a

joint tenant, could not be bound by any

ment Wilford had made.

Because of the Court's refusal to allo>

that line of testimony before the jury the Appellants claim
reversable error.
It is the position of the Respondent that the Court act2:
correctly in refusing Mr. Snow's testimony as the same was
irrelevant and immaterial in view of the fact that (1) you
can not severe a

joint tenancy prior to its creation and (2)

prevailing Utah law as ennunciated in Hawkins v. Perry et aL
supra,

renders such testimony irrelevant in any event.

Under

the law as set forth in Hawkins, Virginia Ashton is bound

b'

the acts and promises of Wilford.
It is respectfully submitted to the Court that th 1

11

court's refusal to allow the testimony of Mr. Snow does not

(I tll

constitute reversable error and in fact constitutes no error
rt

L

cl

l l.

POINT IV:

THERE WAS NO INCAPACITY OF ANY MAJOR PARTY

WITNESS AT TRIAL AND THEREFORE i'lO ERROR.
At the conclusion of the testimony, the Appellant
Wilford Ashton apparently suffered some type of health problem
and was taken to the hospital.

He had already testified, and

there was no further need for him at trial, nor was he re-called
as a witness by any of the parties at trial.

Counsel for

Appellants requested the Court to explain to the jury what had
happened, but the Court refused, and merely advised the jury
that Mr. Wilford Ashton had been "excused".

Appellants cite

the Court's actions in this regard as reversable error.
Counsel for Respondent knows of no law supporting Appellants' contention.

It would seem however, that the Court's

actions in regard to this occurrence were proper in that it
remained neutral regarding the same.

If the Court had launched

into a long explanation and dissertation regarding Mr. Wilford
Ashton's health problems it could just as easily gotten the
sympathy of the jury in favor of the Appellants and against the
Respondent as the alternative of refusing to say anything could
have worked the other way.

It seems to the Respondent that the

Court acted properly and that point IV of Appellants' claim of
is not worthy of serious consideration.

(11)

CONCLUSION
It is respectfully submitted by Respondent lhdl the
jury verdict and judgement of the tr1,\l court should be affirmed.
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